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Forthcoming in Asian Journal of Law and Society, (Cambridge 
University Press (2014), pp. 1–20. 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the controversial concept of legal culture. It first 
considers the different meanings of the term and the variety of debates in 
which it figures. It then goes on to consider difficulties in deciding the 
units to which the term legal culture is applied, and the problems in using 
the term in explanations. It concludes by examining the way assumptions 
about what gives legal culture its coherence have implications for 
explaining how and when it changes. In each section of the argument an 
attempt is also made to show the relevance of these questions for this 
journal as seen in the articles published in its first issue. 
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The term legal culture is employed by lawyers, politicians, and, 
sometimes, (even) ordinary citizens, as well as by scholars belonging to 
different scientific disciplines.1 But it is also a highly controversial one. 
Lawrence Friedman, who introduced the concept into the sociology of 
law now describes legal culture as “a troublesome concept”, he admits 
that it is “an abstraction and a slippery one” and that “there is a serious 
problem of definition”. If he were to start over again, he says, he might 
not use it again 2. Yet, as seen in the first issue of this important new 
journal, he continues to use the term, in this case so as to argue that we 
are now witnessing the spread of a “global legal culture” 3 that is widely 
accepted and is bound to spread further. Any such claim about global 
legal culture not only presupposes that the term has sense but that we can 
also point to changes in individual legal cultures resulting from its 
encroachment on them.  Friedman’s paper in fact takes as its target a 
recent book by David and Jaruwan Engels4 that challenged this claim by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 There are Chairs in Legal Culture and Centres dedicated to it in places such as the 
University of Girona (Spain), the University of Copenhagen, the University of 
Lapland (Finland)and the University of Wuhan (China). The term is widely employed 
in studies of legal and social change. A recent special issue of the journal Retfaerd 
edited by Hanne Petersen was entitled “Legal cultures on the move” (Petersen 2008). 
Likewise, a recent five-year project, “Legal Cultures in Transition—the Impact of 
European Integration” (involving researchers in England, Scotland and Norway and 
financed by the Norwegian Research Council), aimed “to provide “thick descriptions” 
of legal cultures in three EU member states (Britain, Poland, Bulgaria), one EEA state 
(Norway) and one near -neighbourhood state.”  
2 See Friedman, (2006). 3!Or, more exactly, a “modern legal culture”.!
4 Engels and Engels (2010). 
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showing how legal consciousness in Thailand’s second largest city did 
not seem to be following such a trend.  
But even if the trajectory of global legal culture is controversial, the 
emergence of this journal is itself symptomatic of the way many countries 
in Asia are undergoing important processes of socio-legal transformation. 
What is interesting is the fact that talking about “culture” is often seen as 
unhelpful in studying these developments. Increasingly both by locally 
based socio- legal scholars and foreign commentators are unhappy with 
any type of explanation that relies on the alleged Asian reluctance to use 
law.  This is now seen as representing a lazy short cut that obviates the 
need for genuine investigation or, at worst, a thinly disguised effort at 
preserving the status quo5. For many years, for example, scholars tried to 
explain why Japan was a society where lawyers, judges and litigation 
were relatively marginal. For some writers the best explanation of this 
was a “culturalist” one that referred to specific features of how law and 
formal dispute processing were perceived and lived in Japan (and Asia 
more generally).6 Other writers strongly disagreed arguing that the 
explanation depended more on politically shaped institutional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!Miyazawa!(1995)!describes!how!the!legal!departments!of!Japanese!corporations!claimed!that!litigation!would!be!un@Japanese.!
6 See Kawashima (1963); for more nuanced approaches see the later work of Tanase 
(2010) or Feldman (2006b), arguing here, as in other work, that Japanese cultural 
specificity can sometimes lead to more use of law! 
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impediments to relying on the courts or other economic disincentives.7 It 
seems as if the latter writers have prevailed. The interest of younger 
scholars now increasingly lies in describing and explaining ‘law and 
society’ institutional aspects of legal change rather than arguing about 
cultural specificity8. They seek to examine empirical variables in the 
light of general approaches in socio-legal studies, economics, or political 
science taken from the wider literature 9. Why have certain institutional 
changes been introduced? Where have the ideas behind them come from? 
Where are they intended to take the legal system and what effects have 
they had so far? How far do they reflect or help create social change? 6 
Claims about differences within Asia as compared to other places have to 
be illustrated through careful documentation of the same kinds of 
variation that are examined by socio-legal scholars everywhere else, and 
by using the same methods. 
But banishing all talk of legal culture may not be an unmixed blessing. 
To judge by the sample of papers published in the first issue of the 
journal a clearer focus on the relationship between law and culture could 
represent a valuable route to finding a common language to 
understanding and evaluating differences in patterns of legally oriented 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Haley (1978); Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989, 1999). 
8 See also Ginsburg and Hoetker (2004) who discuss the interplay between Japan’s 
economic downturn and the increased turn to law. 
9 See the chapters in  Vanoverbeke,  Maesschalck,  Nelken and Parmentier eds.(2014). 
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behaviour. In this paper10, I shall first consider the different meanings of 
the term and the variety of debates in which it figures. I then go on to 
consider difficulties in deciding the units to which the term legal culture 
is applied, and the problems in using the term in explanations. I conclude 
by examining the way assumptions about what gives legal culture its 
coherence have implications for explaining how and when it changes. If, 
as Wedong JI writes in his foreword, “the relationship between law and 
society has never been more important and more elusive,” 11 it can be 
important to clarify to what use a term like legal culture is being and may 
be put.  
 
1. The meanings of legal culture. 
 
When Lawrence Friedman introduced the idea of legal culture into 
sociology of law and legal history it was intended to serve as a “term of 
art”, part of his effort to show that social pressures and needs shape legal 
change more than autonomous developments within legal tradition itself. 
But others do not always limit themselves to this task. Both “law” and 
“culture” are polysemic terms, and studies of law in relation to culture 
can cover a large range of topics. As Sally Merry has recently put it, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 I draw also on previous work, See especially Nelken (2012, 2014). 
11 Wedong Ji (2014), p.3. 
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“legal culture is a very productive concept, as well as a very incoherent 
one. It means many different things to different scholars. Perhaps this is 
why it is so useful.” 12The word “culture” has been said to be the most 
complex in the English language.  Anthropologists have become leery 
about using the term because of the dangers of “essentialism” or 
“culturalism”. Much the same applies to the term “legal”. Indeed, many 
law professors earn a good living by discussing its highly contested 
meanings. Some scholars take the easy way out and use legal culture 
simply as a rough equivalent of “legal system or to point to the specific 
techniques of exposition and interpretation employed by jurists and other 
legal actors. But whilst these ways of understanding the term are 
relatively straightforward they offer little to our conceptual armoury 
when it comes to seeking explanations of legal change.  
If this was not enough, there is also significant overlap between the idea 
of legal culture and what, in some places, is called the “culture of 
legality” (stressing the “legal” before the word “culture”). The latter term, 
which corresponds very roughly to what in English is called “the rule of 
law”, is particularly common in those jurisdictions, or parts of 
jurisdictions where state rules are systematically avoided or evaded, such 
as the former Soviet Union, Latin America or the south of Italy. The point 
of talking of “legal culture” in these places cases is less to conduct an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Merry (2012). 
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explanatory exercise and more to point to the normative goal of getting 
“legality” into the culture of everyday social and political life and so 
reorienting the behaviour of such populations towards (state) law and/or 
encouraging state law to respect certain limits of action. “Law” and 
“culture” are words whose interpretation and definition have illocutionary 
effects (“this is the law”, “that behaviour is inconsistent with our 
culture”). The term “legal culture” too, is used by judges, politicians or 
others (including academics) in the course of making claims about what 
is or is not consonant with a given body of law, practices or ideals, can be 
as much prescriptive as descriptive. It helps constitute the facts it purports 
to describe or explain.  
 Legal actors such as judges need to work with some supposedly 
consensual idea of culture as a regulative ideal, even as they argue what 
the law requires. As Jeremy Webber puts it: 
“The concept of culture is not so much a way of identifying highly 
specified and tightly bounded units of analysis, then, as a heuristic device 
for suggesting how individual decision-making is conditioned by the 
language of normative discussion, the set of historical reference points, 
the range of solutions proposed in the past, the institutional norms taken 
for granted, given a particular context of repeated social interaction. The 
integrity of cultural explanations does not depend upon the “units” being 
exclusive, fully autonomous, or strictly bounded. Rather, it depends upon 
! 8!
there being sufficient density of interaction to generate distinctive terms 
of evaluation and debate. When there is that density, any examination of 
decision-making in that context will want to take account of those terms” 
13 
Because of this prescriptive quality, however, culture – and legal culture- 
are terms that can easily lend themselves to misuse. For Patrick Glenn, a 
leading comparative law scholar, the idea of culture is suspect both 
because of its origins and its consequences. It came in, he claims, to 
replace the dirty work done by the idea of “race” and it necessarily 
implies that patterns of behaviour and attitudes are static and necessarily 
doomed to conflict.14 Cultural analyses also both unify and essentialise 
the notion of culture, so that scholars are tempted to orientalise behaviour 
as foreign and irrational and ignore or downplay the importance of 
economic and political drivers of change. The German word Kultur, for 
instance, emerged as a defensive term used in romantic opposition to the 
French universalizing idea of civilization (for which today’s discourses of 
democracy and human rights could be considered equivalents?). For him, 
by contrast, cultures should not be treated as “super organic”, or 
“substantive, bounded entities”, but rather seen as “shreds and patches 
remaking themselves”.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Webber (2004), p.32. 
14 Glenn 2004. 
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On the other hand, critiques such as Glenn’s fail to do justice to current 
socio-legal ways of talking about legal culture. At this time of increased 
export and import of legal institutions and ideas few if any scholars talk 
of cultures as closed, uncontested and self-referential in the way Glenn 
imagines. Merry, for example, insists that “cultural ideas are contested 
and connected to relations of power. Cultural repertoires include both 
values and practices, ideas and habits, and innovations along with 
commonsensical ways of doing things. Culture is the product of historical 
influences rather than evolutionary change. It is marked by hybridity and 
creolization rather than uniformity or consistency. Local systems are 
embedded in national and transnational processes and particular historical 
trajectories”15. Far from assuming consensus, Friedman’s well- known 
distinction between “external” and “internal” legal culture deliberately 
invites us to investigate the possibility of large differences between legal 
professionals and other members of a given society and emphasizes the 
extent to which legal change depends on larger social pressures. 
Friedman’s use of the word culture is in fact closer to the French idea of 
civilisation than it is to the German idea of Kultur. If anything, rather 
than the essentialism” that so worries Glenn, the problem here is the over 
-ready assumption that the spread of American “horizontal” relationships 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Merry (2012), p. 55 
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and consumerism signifies that we are all moving towards a global legal 
culture that is based around individualism, equality and human rights.  
All of the papers in the first issue of this journal have something to tell us 
about the connexions between law and culture (some even put this in 
their title). Aoki speaks of the importance of the common knowledge that 
others can and do assume at ruler, organisation and individual levels. 
Weidong Ji tells us that it is consensus that allows markets to exist. And 
he looks forward to the day when the distinctive cultural systems of Asia 
combine Confucian philosophy with Habermasian theory of 
communicative action and build a new Asian order with a fundamental 
consensus on social values as its foundation.16 We learn how culture 
helps shape the choices of Chinese businessmen17, the ways that cultural 
differences can frustrate transplants18, and the battles over changing 
legal culture that play out in China19 and Singapore20. But the meanings 
given to culture and legal culture can be quite different. One author looks 
for what explains conceptions of good and bad judging in China and “the 
West” 21. At the other extreme, a paper seeking to explain judicial 
decision making in the Philippines treats the institution of the judiciary as 
sufficiently similar cross -culturally so as to be able to test out (confirm) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Weidong Ji (2014)  op.cit. 
17 Chan, Ho, and Young (2014). 
18 Trzcinski and Upham (2014). 
19 Liu, Liang, and Halliday (2014). 
20 Chua  (2014). 
21 Jacob (2014). 
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established political science findings about the determinants of judicial 
decisions in the USA.22 
But it is a moot point whether actual attempts to study legal culture can 
ever be entirely free of particular cultural or value-shaped ideas of what 
legal order requires. As in comparative law enquiries, a good dose of 
reflexivity is advisable if we are to begin to grasp how other legal 
cultures are different from our own. Friedman is adamant that his 
approach is one that advances general sociological insights, and that what 
he is describing is not the result of  an ³American² culturally shaped view 
of law.23 The global legal culture he sees as emerging has to do with 
modernity rather than “the West” (except inasmuch as the West 
modernised first). But, as I am sure he would agree, even academic 
cultures are also shaped by local culture24. Friedman’s distinction 
between internal and external legal culture has been seen as itself the 
product of a cultural history that values laws independence from 
politics.25 The priority he gives to showing that it is external legal culture 
that is responsible for legal change may also sit better in Common law 
than continental legal cultures. It seems plausible to speak of people in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Dalla Pellegrina, Escresa and Garoupa (2014). 
23 Personal communication by email from Lawrence Friedman (28 December 2012), 
commenting on Nelken  (2012b).  
24 Interestingly, Weidong Ji, in his foreword to the first issue, tells us that, for him, 
“socio-legal studies are being based on collectivism (guanxi)”.  
25 See Engel (2012). 
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Thailand as relying on religion rather than law. But we may fail to 
appreciate how far religion has shaped and continues to shape our own 
institutions. 26 Do we risk imposing ethnocentric meaning when we say 
that the victim of an accident in Thailand feels that the “accident was in 
short his own fault”. 27 When we use American political science methods 
to understand the judiciary in the Philippines is it self evidently correct to 
equate Democratic versus Republican judicial appointments with the 
difference between judges who have government or opposition 
sympathies? 28 
Should we even attempt value neutrality in using the term legal culture? 
Arguably, it is important to try to keep descriptive and normative 
meanings apart if we want to be able to examine which sorts of legal 
culture are conducive to creating “the culture of legality”. But the exact 
content of the rule of law remains controversial. Liu, Liang, and 
Halliday’s absorbing paper about the trials of Li Zhuang uses the terms 
professionalism versus populism to refer to the contending principles at 
stake (which they link to the antinomies of procedure and substance and 
law and politics)29. They leave us in little doubt that liberal legalism and 
the rule of law requires the triumph of professionalism. But it is far from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Jacob (2014) explains Western ideas of the judge as profoundly influenced by 
Christianity. 
27 Friedman (2014). 
28 Dalla Pellegrina, Escresa and Garoupa (2014). 
29 Liu, Liang, and Halliday (2014). 
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clear that these universal -sounding dilemmas mean the same thing in 
China as they do in the USA 30. Of course there is nothing wrong with 
scholars wanting to be part of the struggle for the rule of law, as well as 
seeking to explain them. But in that case it can be difficult to describe 
events without assuming that “power” and “interest” plays a greater role 
on the side to which you are less sympathetic.31 
 
2. Debating legal culture 
 
Problems of definition lie at root of a number of different kinds debates 
over legal culture. It may be helpful to distinguish these. The first 
concerns whether we really need the term. Given the uncertainties about 
its meanings why not choose alternatives advocated by other scholars, 
such as ideology, community, mentalities, the legal complex, traditions, 
epistemes, formants, path-dependency, or even legal autopoiesis? 32 
Certainly legal culture needs to compete with these other possible terms. 
On the other hand, each of these terms has it’s own drawbacks. The 
concept of “living law”, for example, only gets at part of what Friedman 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 The paper by Jacob in the same issue provides some clues as to why there is 
support in China for a different approach to judicial autonomy, and it is easy to see 
that “popular justice” in recent Chinese history has meant both more and less than 
“public participation”. 
31 See also Stanton’s account of the consequences in Burma when religious precepts, 
custom and equity were made irrelevant by legal formalism. 
32 Nelken  (2006). 
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and others seek to explain with the term legal culture. Nor does it lend 
itself easily for use in comparing legal systems. Much the same is true of 
the concept of ideology33, which has the further problem that it requires 
us to justify giving ourselves a privileged position in describing other 
people’s ideas. Legal tradition carries more promise. But it would be an 
awkward way of describing differences between societies such as the 
length court delays. As far as autopoiesis is concerned, one of the 
purposes of using the term legal culture is to problematise the extent of 
legal culture’s autonomy under different circumstances. But, on at least 
some readings, Luhmann’s theory resolves this issue by theoretical fiat.  
Secondly, there is the debate about how to make the term serviceable 
(given its various meanings). As many authors have pointed out, if we are 
to make use of a term for the purpose of carrying out empirical 
investigations, it is important to be able to operationalise it. Can an idea 
that covers everything from professing culture to the culture of the 
professions do anything but sow confusion? Merry has recently proposed 
breaking up the idea of legal culture into what she calls four “social 
dimensions”34. “The first is the practices and ideologies within the legal 
system, the everyday way of getting things done, shared assumptions 
about good and bad clients, and other internal rules and practices, some 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Cotterrell  (1996). 
34 Merry (2012). 
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of which are based on legal doctrine and others on categorizations shared 
by the wider society, such as ideas of race and gender35. Then there is 
the public’s attitude towards the law—whether the legal system is seen as 
a source of corruption and ethnic preference, for example, or is instead 
viewed as an institution that offers the rule of law for all people equally, 
regardless of their background.”36 “Beyond this”, Merry argues, “there is 
the question of legal mobilization, which refers to how readily people 
define their problems in legal terms when they turn to the law for help. A 
fourth dimension is legal consciousness, the extent to which an individual 
sees themselves as embedded in the law and entitled to its protections. 
Experience with the law, both good and bad,” she argues, “can change 
legal consciousness. It may encourage further use or may drive the 
litigant to avoid the law next time.”37 38 
For those critical of the term, however, it is this very multiplicity of 
meanings that makes it inadvisable to use the term 39. The Von Benda-
Beckmann’s for instance see the call to distinguish legal culture into its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Merry says that this corresponds to Friedman’s term “internal legal culture” 
36 This can be related to what Friedman describes as “external legal culture”.  
37 Id. 
38 Merry argues that these last two aspects offer the best way to understand the 
cultural dimensions of law and its relationship to a social context as well as providing 
a more satisfactory analysis of the processes of translation across legal fields and the 
hybridity of these fields. She emphasizes that these are dimensions rather than distinct 
forms of social behaviour. 
39 Von Benda-Beckman and Von Benda-Beckmann (2012). 
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constituent elements as a reason to jettison the larger term altogether. For 
them: 
“there can be no doubt that the concept summarizes important social 
phenomena. The question is whether it makes sense to capture them in 
one analytical concept and treat them as one unit for purposes of 
description, comparison and social theory. . . . Once legal culture is 
disassembled, it becomes difficult to reconstruct it as an analytical 
category. The study of empirical complexity and the interdependencies of 
its components will not become easier if captured as “legal culture”. . . . 
If the term refers to attitudes, knowledge, expectations and values, why 
not talk about attitudes, knowledge, expectations and values? If it refers 
to ideologies or to the values embedded in law, why not call them thus? 
These concepts are general enough. Lumping too many things together 
into “legal culture” or into “units” of legal culture easily obscures 
interrelations between the elements that are lumped together”40. 
A third matter of debate is where (and how) we should look for legal 
culture. Is it mainly a matter of attitudes and/or behaviour- or is it their 
relationship that matters? How far can we distinguish legal culture from 
political, economic or religious culture? In what ways do these spheres 
interrelate? How is what is demarcated as legal culture to be related to 
and contrasted with other aspects of society, for example institutional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann (2012), p. 102. 
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behaviour or social structure? Much the same applies to drawing the line 
between culturally shaped behaviour and all other behaviour. Should the 
term be confined to irrational or, at least, value-based, action rather than 
purely instrumental social action? Put differently, is legal culture a matter 
of taken-for-Granted attitudes and behaviour or also deliberate choice? If 
culture is defined too broadly, so as to include everything else, then it is 
left with nothing to explain. But if it is operationalized too narrowly, it 
takes on a residual quality, only to be resorted to if and when other 
explanations run out. For Silbey, for example,  
“the law operates, perhaps most powerfully, by rendering the world 
unproblematic. Indeed, in organizing and giving meaning to the most 
routine, everyday events—such as buying groceries or driving down the 
street—the law may be most present in its conspicuous absence.” Hence, 
she explains: 
“We are more likely to observe it at those moments when the routine 
seems to break down. At moments when expectations are thwarted and 
tacit assumptions negated, people’s actions often reveal what is usually 
their unarticulated understandings of the mundane; in short, that the 
taken-for- granted reveals itself in its breach”41. 
Friedman’s now classical distinction between “internal” legal culture 
(that of legal actors and “taught tradition”) and “external” legal culture !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Silbey (2012), p. 137. 
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(the pressures brought by social groups and social and technological 
change) can also be tricky to work with. How much is internal legal 
culture distinguishable from wider culture? What should we make of the 
way judges sometimes seek to incorporate lay definitions of appropriate 
behaviour into their reasoning? Do lawyers belong to “internal legal 
culture”, as servants of the courts, or “external legal culture” as agents of 
social groups and of individual litigants? The answer of course is both.  
When reading discussions of whether an interpretation of a given legal 
culture is convincing, or not, it can often be difficult to see where 
definitional disagreements end and empirical objections begin. Erhard 
Blankenburg, for example, takes Friedman to be arguing that it is “folk” 
culture – in the sense of public demand – that shapes differences in legal 
behaviour. He tells us, by contrast, that a comparison of courts in 
Germany and the Netherlands shows that they have very different 
litigation rates even though, he argues, they have similar folk cultures. 
For him, therefore it is institutional and infrastructural arrangements that 
represent the key to differences in legal culture. In his view, “there is no 
legal culture outside of institutions”42. But, the opposite terms are used 
in the debate over whether the low level of use of law in Japan is to be 
attributed to deliberate cultural avoidance of litigation, or is rather a result 
of structural arrangements that block access to the courts. There those !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Blankenberg (1996); but see also Nelken (1996). 
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arguing for the importance of  “institutions” treat this as an alternative to 
culture rather than as just an alternative site of culture. 
More awareness of these debates could be relevant to the papers 
published in the first issue. For many agencies and actors, understanding 
the differences between legal cultures provides the key to the possibilities 
of success of legal transplants from one culture to another. As a recent 
World Bank study reported: 
“Legal culture is often considered as a given feature of the local 
environment to which proposed legal reform projects must adapt; many 
argue that legal and judicial reform programs must be tailored to fit local 
legal culture or they will fail.  Other times, the prevailing legal culture 
itself may be the object of reform, rather than merely a constraint. Thus, 
understanding the arguments related to the concept of legal culture will 
become increasingly important for aspiring legal reformers. Does the 
legal system not work well because people distrust the courts, or do 
people distrust the courts because the legal system doesn’t work well?  Is 
the introduction of a new contract law unlikely to have an effect because 
the business culture prefers informal deals with family and friends, or 
does the preference for informal dealing exist only because no one has 
yet passed an efficient contract law?  These sorts of problems are not easy 
to resolve, especially because the causality clearly runs in both directions, 
and the interactions between beliefs and actions are extraordinarily 
! 20!
complex.” 43On the other hand it has been strongly argued that the term 
is not helpful for trying to predict the effects of legal transplants.44 
Pragmatically, it would be 
fair to say that the two papers in the journal about unsuccessful efforts at 
transplanting in Burma and Cambodia each point to the variables that 
effect the capacity of resistance of local (legal) culture.  The paper by 
Leah Trzcinski and Frank Upham, for example, offers a fascinating 
account of the difficulties of transplanting the idea of a land registry to 
Cambodia. They show that this transplant presupposed unrealistic levels 
of technical proficiency, social sophistication and economic resources. 
But they add that it is neither possible nor necessary to answer the 
question of whether top-down reforms conducted by foreign technocrats 
are always doomed to fail. 
 
3 The units of legal culture 
What unit(s) are being referred to when we speak about legal cultures -
and how does legal culture help reproduce them? Evidence of legal 
culture can be found in different approaches to regulation, administration 
and dispute resolution. It may concern variations in ideas of what is 
meant by “law” (and what law is “for”), of where and how it is to be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 World Bank (2001), see also the commentary by Barron, (2005). 
44 Gillespie (2008). 
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found (types of legal reasoning, the role of case law and precedent, of 
general clauses as compared with detailed drafting, of the place of law 
and fact), the extent to which law is party or state-directed (bottom–up or 
top–down), the role and importance of the judiciary, or the nature of legal 
education and legal training. There may be important contrasts in the 
degree to which given controversies are subject to law, the role of other 
forms of expertise, the part played by “alternatives” to law, including not 
only arbitration and mediation but also the many “infrastructural” ways 
of discouraging or resolving disputes.  
Most often, research starts from what appear to be puzzling features of 
the role and the rule of law within a given jurisdiction. Why do the UK 
and Denmark complain most about the imposition of EU law but then 
turn out to be the countries that have the best records of obedience? 
Conversely, why does Italy, whose public opinion is most in favour of 
Europe, have such a high rate of non-compliance? How is it that Holland, 
otherwise so similar, has such a low litigation rate compared with 
neighbouring Germany? In the United States and the UK it often takes a 
sex scandal to create official interest in doing something about 
corruption, whereas in Latin countries it takes a major corruption scandal 
to excite interest in marital unfaithfulness. Such contrasts necessarily lead 
us to reconsider broader theoretical issues in the study of law and society. 
How does the importance of “enforcement” as an aspect of law vary in 
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different societies? What can be learned, and what is likely to be 
obscured, by defining “law” in terms of litigation rates? How do shame 
and guilt cultures condition the boundaries of law and in what ways does 
law help shape those self-same boundaries? 
But we need to be cautious about assuming that the boundaries of legal 
culture will always correspond with those of a unified nation state. This 
would be especially misleading where we are dealing with behaviour in 
plural legal systems where people can and do draw on different normative 
repertoires for different purposes. In addition, (as Friedman’s paper in the 
first issue makes clear) it is increasingly important to asking how global 
culture is shaping local legal culture. Legal systems have always been 
affected by a variety of processes of borrowing, imitation and imposition 
and nation states have never been the exclusive or even predominant 
source of norms. But the insertion of nation states in larger bilateral or 
multilateral structures and networks means that there is an increasingly 
widening gap between the (global) sites where issues arise and the places 
where they are managed (the nation state). It is more and more 
misleading to use terms that suggest boundaries at a time when it would 
be more appropriate to speak of “flows”. 
Different kinds of units emerge as objects and as agents of control. 
Instead of governments, the talk is increasingly of “governance”, of how 
power is exercised at a series of other levels and by other institutions, in 
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collaboration or otherwise with state bodies. The “denationalization” of 
rule making means that rule-formulation and settlement takes place 
within new transnational agencies, and that these transnational public and 
semi-public networks substitute, to an increasing extent, for national 
governments. All this varies by different areas of legal and social 
regulation. A contrast is often made between, on the one hand, those 
areas of law that are relatively internationalized, such as international 
business contracts, antitrust and competition policy, Internet and new 
technology, labour law, social law and environment law, and, on the other 
hand, family law and property law. But experts in these latter fields ate 
amongst those most likely to be engaged in efforts to bring about legal 
harmonisation.  
As the world is increasingly being tied together by trade and 
communication many people increasingly have the sense of living in an 
interdependent global system marked by borrowing and lending across 
porous cultural boundaries which are saturated with inequality, power 
and domination. All this means that the purported uniformity, coherence 
or stability of given national cultures will often be no more than an 
ideological projection or rhetorical device used by some of those within 
or outside a given society or other context. We need to avoid reifying 
national or other stereotypes and recognize that much that goes under the 
name of culture is no more than “imagined communities” or “invented 
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traditions”. On the other hand, claims about the decline of the nation state 
can be taken too far. Differences between legal cultures still often track 
wider social and cultural patterns that roughly coincide with national 
political boundaries. The imposition of a common legal code and the 
common training of legal officials form part of deliberate attempts to 
achieve and consolidate national identity. Borders continue to play 
important instrumental and symbolic roles, not least in responding to 
immigration.  
The recent rise of punitiveness in many Western countries, for example, 
has been seen as an attempt by the nation state to re-assert its sovereignty, 
either as a form of symbolical “acting-out” or, alternatively, as an 
essential and successful aspect of restructuring the regulation of poverty 
by the neo-liberal penal state. There is even some empirical basis for 
pointing to psychological differences in national traits in the way people 
relate to each other45. Such different, historically conditioned, 
sensibilities may persist over quite long periods. Even if globalization 
produces social and economic differentiation, 46“increasing 
homogenisation of social and cultural forms seems to be accompanied by 
a proliferation of claims to specific authenticities and identities”.47 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Hofstede (1980/2001). 
46 Nelken (1997). 
47 Strathern (1995). 
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Assumptions of necessary convergence underestimate the continuing 
importance of difference and resistance. 
In advance of empirical investigation, it can be rash to assume any 
necessary “fit” between law and its environing national society or culture.  
In seeking to chart the relationship between the global and the local, we 
need to focus attention on levels below and above that of the nation state. 
On the one hand, there is the culture of the local courthouse, the working 
norms of different social and interest groups and professional 
associations, the networks of individuals involved in pursuing, avoiding 
or mediating disputes; on the other, international institutions and 
regulators and the so-called “third cultures” of international trade, 
communication networks and other transnational processes. One of the 
most important challenges for the student of legal culture is to try to 
capture how far globalization represents the attempted imposition of one 
particular legal culture on other societies. Importing countries are offered 
both the Anglo-American model, whose prestige is spread by trade and 
the media, and national versions of the more intellectually impressive 
Continental legal systems embodied in ready-packaged codes. The 
Anglo-American model is characterized as laying more emphasis on the 
link between law and the economy (rather than law and the state), and its 
reliance on legal procedures that prioritize orality, party initiative and 
negotiation inside law. But, as much as any particular feature of its legal 
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procedure, what certainly does seem to be spreading is the common law 
ideology of “pragmatic legal instrumentalism”, the very idea that law is 
something that does or should “work”, together with the claim that this is 
something that can or should be assessed in ways which are separable 
from wider political considerations. 
The large variety of units of legal culture discussed by the papers in the 
first issue confirms many of the points that we have noted in this section. 
Some authors focus on large national units such as Burma or Japan. 
Weidong Ji points to the way that globalisation can says increases 
pluralisation within the nation- state and a stress on locality. Friedman 
rather stresses the spread of global culture as a vector for legal 
homogenisation. But even he admits that China may represent something 
of an exception. There also discussions of legal actors and institutions 
such as judges in the Philippines and the USA, prosecutors, defence 
lawyers and the Bar Association in China. Some consideration is also 
given to the way law is used by actors outside the legal system such as 
businessmen and politicians in China, or management consultants in 
Cambodia.  
Significantly, we learn that what goes on in given contexts often depends 
on the efforts by outsiders to change local culture, whether this be the 
direct intervention by the British colonial power, is in the Burma study, 
or, in the case of Cambodia, the more indirect, but no less telling, 
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pressure of international Japanese, Australian, German, Finnish experts 
and donors, in addition to that of the ubiquitous World bank and the 
USA. Interestingly, however, Trzcinski and Upham also tell us that 
politicians in countries like Cambodia appreciate that outsider are 
reluctant to actually withdraw once they have invested in a country, 
however unsuccessful their reform efforts. Less is said in these studies 
about the way processes of comparison and standardisation themselves 
constitute and transform units 48. Jacob speaks of China as counterposed 
to the (Christian) West as the product of historical processes. These have 
led to what he characterises as “irreconcilable logics of justice in 
action”49 But Weidong Ji sees Asia as a socially constructed 
geographical and political concept, and suggests that Europe, America 
and Asia have a need to contrast themselves with the “other”.  
 
4. Explaining legal culture 
 
Probably the most vexing issue of all is whether legal culture can be used 
to provide explanations or, instead, at best, is something that needs to be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Nelken (2015). 
49 Jacob (2014) op cit, 29. His paper is also particularly valuable by showing that 
“we”, rather than the “other”, have (religious) culture. By as comparison the book by 
the Engles speaks in more familiar terms of the continuing or revived influence of 
religion over culture beyond the “West”. 
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explained 50. Is legal culture the name of the question or the answer? If it 
is both will it not inevitably lead to circular arguments of the kind: 
Question, “Why do they use law that way in Japan?” Answer: Because 
that is their (legal) culture! Whilst the should be no difficulty in seeking 
to explain the social economic and political antecedents of given patterns 
of legal cultures when we seek to use legal culture itself as the 
explanation of such patterns there is a serious risk of falling into 
tautology. 
This question is often linked to the problem of what we should count as 
an appropriate unit of legal culture. Roger Cotterrell famously criticised 
Lawrence Friedman for applying the term legal culture to a variety of 
different units, each of which is changing and in a relationship of mutual 
interaction with the others. 51 He points out that Friedman regularly 
treats legal culture as an aggregate characterized by a variety of elements 
or traits, but he also uses legal culture to refer to one element of the 
whole, as when speaking of the individuals or groups who bring pressure 
to bear on the law to produce social change. He complained that this 
meant that legal culture becomes, “an immense, multi-textured overlay of 
levels and regions of culture, varying in content, scope, and influence and 
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50 Nelken (2004). 
51 Cotterrell  (1996). See also Friedman (1996). 
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in their relation to the institutions, practices and knowledges of state legal 
systems”. In consequence, for him: 
“If legal culture refers to so many levels and regions of culture—with the 
scope of each of these ultimately indeterminate because of the 
indeterminacy of the scope of the idea of legal culture itself—the problem 
of specifying how to use the concept as a theoretical component in 
comparative sociology for law remains”. 52  
Sally Kenny made a similar kind of objection to the term when reviewing 
the second edition of Blankenburg and Bruinsma’s book, Dutch Legal 
Culture 53. She first summarizes what they have to say about legal 
culture as an aggregate: 
“The Dutch legal culture is pragmatic and flexible, rather than rigid and 
formalistic. It favours consensus, inclusion, discussion, and negotiation 
(if only among all relevant elites) rather than conflict and dichotomous, 
legally-enforceable outcomes. The absence of judicial review of 
legislation coexists with wide judicial, administrative, and prosecutorial 
discretion. The Europeanization of legal practices, greater public concern 
about crime, and a reduced willingness to fund a generous welfare state, 
however, are eroding the distinctive aspects of Dutch legal culture.” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Cotterrell (1996), p. 17. 
53 Blankenburg and Bruinsma (1991). 
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But she then goes on to voice her misgivings about asking an aggregate to 
play the role of a variable: “I agree that legal culture is not reducible 
merely to public opinion or attitudes of legal professionals. Institutions 
both reflect the broader culture and shape it. Institutions and legal culture 
are, as we say, mutually constitutive.” But, she complains that this way of 
using the term means that: 
“Legal culture has that slippery “residual variable” quality about it—
shared by the concept political culture. It is everything and nothing 
simultaneously. It is the totality of laws, practices, and opinions. And it 
somehow simultaneously stands apart from these things and effects how 
they work. It is both cause and effect. “54. Indeed, in response to this 
objection, Bruinsma changed the title, in the next edition of the book, to 
Dutch Law in Action. 55 
Patrick Glenn, likewise, tells us that what he finds particularly 
problematic is the employment of culture as a “holistic signifier” and also 
as a “variable”. He argues that legal culture’s shortcomings come into 
evidence when it shifts from something to be described, interpreted, even 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Kenny (1996), p. 122. On the other hand, hers is by no means a blanket dismissal of 
the term. She goes on immediately to add, “Yet the strongest evidence of the 
importance of legal culture is the different outcomes produced by similar structures in 
two different countries. For example, the Dutch and the British may both have 
informal tribunals for legal conflicts over social security, mental health, and labour, 
yet in Britain, the tribunals will operate formally and legalistically and in the 
Netherlands, informally and flexibly.”  
55 Bruinsma and Blankenburg (2000). 
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perhaps explained, and is treated instead as a source of explanation in 
itself (Glenn 2004). Jeremy Webber agrees, saying: 
“Until a solution is found to this problem, legal culture risks being a 
superficially attractive but ultimately obfuscating concept, insisting upon 
interdependency but then cloaking that interdependency under the rubric 
of a single concept, doing nothing to tease out the specific relations of 
cause and effect within any social field”. 56 
But, despite the force of these claims, it is important to note that the 
existence of different referents for the term does not necessarily have to 
lead to tautology. Whilst Cotterrell is correct to argue that the units of 
legal culture may often not add up to a “unity”, this fact may itself 
provide a good key to the intricacies of lived legal cultures with their mix 
of overlapping and potentially competing elements. Nor is the distinction 
between aggregates and elements a hard and fast one. All wholes can be 
incorporated into yet larger ones, just as all elements can be broken into 
yet smaller ones. Whether it is appropriate to go down or up in levels of 
abstraction will then depend on the purpose of an enquiry, for example 
whether we are comparing whole societies or elements within them. The 
group “attitudes” towards the use of law that are at the centre of 
Friedman’s use of legal culture can also be broken down into smaller 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Webber (2004). But he does concede that it would in principle be worthwhile to try 
to establish “specific relations of cause and effect” id. p. 28. 
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elements. Indeed, Friedman thinks it is plausible to speak of each 
individual’s legal culture. And these individual attitudes or opinions are 
in turn themselves composed of measurable responses to a range of 
particular questions. 
The different ways of using the term, as cause or result, have also to be 
understood against the background of theoretical developments that have 
produced two rather different uses of the term culture. One, the so-called 
anthropological approach to legal culture, takes it to refer to patterns of 
law-related behaviour in given places or contexts as contrasted with other 
times or places. Here the main task is explaining legal culture. The 
second approach is more interested in uncovering the ongoing process of 
meaning making within a given society, as a way of studying legal 
consciousness (as well as getting “beyond legal consciousness”) 57 For 
these investigations legal culture comes to be seen as a source of social 
action. 
How legal culture is used in constructing explanations will also depend 
on the disciplinary framework in which the concept is developed and will 
therefore buy in to a larger set of theoretical ideas about law and society 
and related methodological protocols. We could model our notion of legal 
culture on the idea of political culture with its focus on inquiries into 
voting patterns and types of political system, drawing a parallel between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Silbey (2005). 
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asking whether people go to vote and why they do or do not use law. Or 
we could follow “rational choice” theory, as developed in some political 
science or economics approaches, although “culture” here often 
disappears in favour of other motivations. In line with competing 
approaches to social theory, legal culture can be seen as manifested 
through institutional behaviour, as a factor shaping and shaped by 
divergences in individual legal consciousness, as a pattern of ideas that 
lie behind behaviour, or as another name for politico-legal discourse 
itself. Friedman has always employed the concept in the context of a 
wider theoretical approach based on an input–output model of social 
systems and a pluralist view of power. But the sense of the term will 
change if attempts are made to use it in the context of approaches such as 
those of Marx, Foucault, Bourdieu or Luhmann. 
In practice, what is taken to be legal culture will vary with the empirical 
methods used to grasp and/or measure it (and each method may miss 
something caught by the other). Friedman tells us that legal culture can be 
(indirectly) measured by asking people questions about how they think 
about the law, or by watching what they do. But we should not forget that 
participants themselves are not always aware of crucial features of their 
own legal cultures. Many Americans are convinced that their system of 
negligence law regularly produces excessive and undeserved awards, 
though it turns out that, in large part, this impression is one that is 
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manufactured by the media58. Those societies where legal professionals 
express least concern for what Anglo-American writers call the “gap” 
between the “law in books” and the “law in action”, 59 may not be those 
where the gap is least problematic but those where the gap is 
overwhelming. In such cultures it may just be taken for granted that law 
is more of an aspiration than a guide to what is actually likely to happen. 
 
The papers in the first issue of this journal show the range of possible 
uses of the term in explaining socio-legal behaviour and social and legal 
change. Some are more interested in “internal legal culture”, others in 
“external legal culture. Whereas some papers identify culture and legal 
culture as something to be explained, others treat them as tools for 
explanation. On the one hand, the paper by Jacob seeks to explain 
differences in what is expected of judges in China and “the West”.60 On 
the other, we learn how the choices of Chinese businessmen are shaped 
by their culture 61, and hear about the conditions that affect the extent to 
which formal legal rules do and do not create institutions62. The papers 
draw on a range of different disciplines including political science, 
sociology, and legal history. There is a particularly clear contrast is in 
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58 Haltom and McCaan (2004). 
59 Pound (1910). 
60 Jacob (2014). 
61 Chan, Ho, and Young (2014). 
62 Aoki (2014). 
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part between those who use legal or legal historical analysis, and those 
who use social scientific tools so as to examine institutional behaviour or 
the causes of social change. The study of gender structure and lawyer 
stratification in Japan by Mayumi Nakamura applies the normal socio- 
legal paradigm that would be used in the USA or elsewhere63, and it is 
this strategy that allows it to show the specificities in the Japanese 
situation. The same applies to the paper that seeks to understand the 
determinants of the decisions of Supreme Court judges in Philippines 
where the authors find that even the outcomes are not really different 
from those found in the United States. 
 
5 Coherence and Change 
 
We come, finally, to the most ambitious claim made for the term legal 
culture. Whatever the virtue there may be in recognising  cultural 
variation in how law is thought about, and its ascribed and actual role in 
social life, the real goal for many writers is to understand social change 
and ensure that reforms are successful. Amidst all the effort to improve 
the efficiency of legal institutions in developing countries, for example, it 
can be very relevant to stop and consider that, in legal culture terms, in 
many societies (and in all societies in at least some contexts) official law !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Nakumara (2014). 
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is mainly experienced as a source of unpredictability that threatens to 
disrupt everyday normative patterns and agreements. It is no wonder then 
that well-meaning legal reforms often meet with indifference or hostility.  
For those working with the idea of legal culture it is the strain to 
coherence- the idea that aspects of law-in- society come in “packages” - 
that “explains” or helps makes sense of continuities in patterns of ideas 
and practices over time. By implication therefore it also provides the clue 
to the possibilities of change. But this raises a number of further 
questions. What is it that is being held together—individual opinions and 
attitudes, behaviours, texts, institutions, working groups, ideas and ideals- 
or all of these? And what is doing this? Are we speaking of psychological 
pressures to attitudinal consistency or group conformity, institutional and 
organizational controls and routines, or the constraints and opportunities 
contingent on applying legal or religious texts under changing social 
circumstances. Most important, should we assume that there is always an 
intrinsic link between the elements that make up a given unit, or does the 
connection exist (only) insofar as participants talk about it “as if “ it is 
real? Given that, to a large extent, culture is always a matter of struggle 
and disagreement, the purported uniformity, coherence or stability of 
given national or other cultures will often be no more than a rhetorical 
claim manipulated by members of the culture concerned or projected by 
outside observers. 
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 Is law coherent? Under close scrutiny, any given doctrinally defined area 
of law such as that governing family relations, can in fact be shown to be 
“chaotic”. 64 The same applies to the relationship between different 
branches of law within a jurisdiction65. Arguably, the work of family 
lawyers will have more in common with family lawyers working in other 
places than, it will with, say, copyright lawyers practicing in the same 
jurisdiction. 66 On the other hand, using a comparative perspective, some 
scholars argue that even apparently unconnected branches of law may in 
fact manifest remarkable levels of cultural similarity within a given 
society. As Whitman has claimed recently, in replying to criticisms of his 
“culturalist” approach to penal law: 
“The pattern that we see in comparative punishment is also the pattern we 
see in many other areas of the law. Indeed, I would claim it as a virtue of 
my book that it shows that punishment law cannot be understood in 
isolation from the rest of the legal culture. For example, American 
workplace harassment law differs from German and French workplace 
harassment law in very much the same way. . . . The same is true of 
comparative privacy law . . . just as it is true of the law of hate speech and 
everyday civility. . .  I think these studies carry cumulative weight. “67 
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64 Dewar (1998). 65!Bell!(2001).!
66 See also Bell (2001). 
67 Whitman (2005), p. 396. 
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The question of what is meant by speaking of coherence gets even more 
complex if we examine the assumptions or claims that are made about 
“the fit” between legal culture and other aspects of the same society68. It 
is often assumed that the direction of influence is mainly from culture in 
general to legal culture in particular. Indeed, this is the crux of 
Friedman’s argument; for him, sooner or later, larger culture (re)shapes 
internal legal culture. But we should not assume that the relationship 
between legal practices and ideas and those in the wider society 
necessarily are homologous. Take, for example, Kagan’s characterization 
of what he calls “the American way of law”69. His claim is that this is a 
consequence of what he calls, a “fundamental mismatch” between, on the 
one hand, the demand for social and political justice through law together 
with the expectations of equal opportunities demanded by interest groups 
and individuals, and, on the other hand, because the role of central and 
local government is deliberately hamstrung, the difficulty of meeting 
these demands, except piecemeal through the courts. There are also 
important differences in the extent to which any given culture gives value 
to similarities in its legal and wider culture spheres. In places such as 
Italy an insistence on great “formalism” in legal matters is intended to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 See Nelken, (1986, 2009). 
69 Kagan (2001); see also Nelken (2003). 
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differentiate the legal world from the lack of such formalism in the “life 
world” of ordinary social interaction. 
 
The alleged strain towards coherence can used to explain the relative lack 
of change, the difficulty of change and the direction of change 70. But we 
should never rule out the possibility of even rapid change. It is relevant- 
if also worrying- to recall the transformations in attitudes towards “law 
and order” in the short period that elapsed from Weimar to Hitlerian 
Germany. And, in an ever more interconnected world, considerable effort 
is required just to resist outside influence. Arguments about the 
possibility of change can themselves play a role in social developments. 
The claim, for example, that long-standing historical patterns cannot be 
altered can easily be “dystopic” in its effects by blocking possible 
reforms. After the collapse of the Soviet Union there were those who 
used past culture as an alibi for why things could not change in countries 
that had been part of the Soviet bloc71. On the other hand, arguments 
about culture can also be used to show that change is possible. Most 
obviously, many of those write about global culture do so in ways that 
make its spread appear more or less inevitable, and even more 
problematically, they assume that it brings about homogenisation. 
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71 See Krygier (1996-1997). 
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In any research into legal culture it is important to be attentive to both 
coherence and change. Consider again the example earlier concerning 
differences in the pattern of scandals in the UK and Italy.  Recent 
expense scandals concerning Members of Parliament in England and 
Wales were not in fact based around sexual improprieties. Conversely, 
there were attempts to bring down Prime Minister Berlusconi in Italy for 
alleged sexual improprieties. Yet we can still see the continuity 
underneath the apparent change. It is surely worthy of note that the UK 
scandals concerned private misbehaviour by Members of Parliament 
rather than corrupt agreements between politicians and businessmen. 
Conversely, Italian former Prime Minister Berlusconi’s sexual 
misbehaviour became a more serious issue with voters when it was 
alleged to have involved the alleged facilitation of public works contracts 
to those who supplied him with women. And his official exclusion from 
the right to stand as a political candidate was a result not of these 
scandals but the consequence of his receiving a  definitive conviction for 
fiscal crimes.  
Many of the papers in the founding issue of the journal also discuss the 
role of culture and of legal culture in social change. Some imply that 
cultural coherence can be undone by change, others stress how it can 
constrain change, and yet others reveal the ways that change can appeal 
to coherence in order to be accepted. Friedman repeats his thesis that 
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social and technological change is the moving force of law and that 
places in the same historical periods tend to have much more in common 
in their legal arrangements than the same place in different historical 
periods. He admits that China may constitute an exception. But he sees 
Thailand (the object of the Engels’ study) as a country undergoing a 
process of transition. He expects it be transformed as people move to the 
towns 72, industrialisation rises (imposing “the rythms of factory life”) 
and ideas about human rights advance; and he points out that even 
Engel’s interviews show that some of the victims they describe in their 
book no longer completely believe their local discourses as their 
perceptions edge closer to the global norm. 73 Arguably, however, 
Friedman’s preference for emphasising similarities runs the risk of 
minimising differences between places at the same level of technological 
and economic development. Aiko, for his part, offers a sophisticated 
analysis of the structural factors that shaped contrasting transitions in 
China and Japan.  
But many authors also want to evaluate the effects of the attempts at 
change they describe. Stanton shows us that change, even where 
achieved, is not always to the good. According to him, English colonial 
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72 Stanton admits that even without colonial intervention Burmese customary law 
might not have withstood the move away from village life (Stanton 2014, p.178). 
73 Friedman does not deal with the Engels’ question why the rise in motor car use in 
the 30 years since their previous study in Changmai had not (yet) led to a rise in Tort 
law there. 
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innovations in Burma such as the introduction of Western standards of 
enforcement of contracts, successfully marginalised existing customs, and 
undermined the traditional legal system. But by so doing they also 
unleashed destructive forces in the society. For him, the British courts 
offered only “order without meaning”. The resistance in Thailand to the 
transformation of Tort in the direction that Friedman expects seems also 
connected to the contestation over the meanings of accidents. By contrast, 
both the paper by Liu, Liang, and Halliday and that authored by Chua, 
focus on the role played by social actors within the society. Their interest 
lies in the way their actions carried the potential to change their legal 
cultures in a positive direction. Their analyses suggest that a crucial part 
of the (limited) success achieved by lawyers in China or gay activists in 
Singapore derives precisely from their knowing the limits of what can be 
done- the ability to appeal to coherence so as to justify change. But it can 
of course be difficult to know in advance the line between what is 
acceptable and what is still beyond the boundaries of change, as seen in 
official response to the adoption of allegedly “aggressive tactics” by 
defence lawyers in present day China. The fate of Li Zhuang 
demonstrates that a high price may be paid for crossing the line.  
The study by Trzcinski and Upham of the effort to introduce a land 
registry in Cambodia offers the best example of the complexities to be 
considered in tracing the encounter between global and local legal 
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culture. They describe the effort to change local patterns of land usage 
into something akin to the concept of ownership imagined by Western 
legal systems74 and show how it soon became clear that the goals of 
strengthening security of land tenure versus pointed in different direction 
from that of integrating Cambodia into the international economic order. 
In practice even the (many) sponsors of change were divided about how 
to proceed, as seen by the move from the 2001 land law to the civil code 
reform of 2007. The effort to create a land registry created too much 
uncertainty, and so the courts were given the final say. But this allowed 
bureaucrats and judges to charge bribes for their services. One way or 
another the most vulnerable members of the population lost out75. Their 
account certainly demonstrates that legal culture matters and the “dangers 
of doing things without clear understanding of local context” 76 when 
adopting models that reflect political preferences from other times and 
places. They conclusion is that “the political and social realities of 
Cambodia will overwhelm any legal framework” and that the alternative 
was “deference to whatever social and normative systems were (and 
probably still are) maintaining whatever degree of order and stability 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!74!`This!was!purportedly so to help create the rule of law as well as to increase food 
production via facilitating foreign direct investment.!75!They!tell!us!that!many Cambodians wanted to hold on to their land rather than 
receive monetary compensation for mistakes of registration.!
76 Trzcinski and Upham (2014), p.67. 
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exist in Cambodia land practice”77. But it is important not to conclude 
too much on the basis of this case study; we should be careful in 
generalising from the limited success of introducing new legal 
architecture in a society where genocide had wiped out the professional 
classes. 
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